The following article appeared in The Manchester Guardian (1901-1959) on Jan 22, 1935, page 5 and is written by Dr B R Ambedkar. – editor  

[This is the fifth of the series of six articles giving the views of Indian leaders on the reforms. Previous articles appeared on January 17, 18, 19, and 21. Dr. Ambedkar is the leader of the Indian depressed classes and a delegate to the Round-table Conference.] 

Are these reforms welcome to Indians? If I were only an Indian I would have no hesitation in saying that they are not and that they cannot be. They may appear as constituting an advance over the present position, but in fact, they are not. Take the much-vaunted provincial autonomy. The reforms proposals, it is true, hand over all departments to Ministers. But also they not only subject the departments proposed to be transferred to the special veto of the governor but they extend it also to those already transferred and which were hitherto free from its operation. To put it plainly, the new Constitution for the provinces is a diarchy just as the old has been. 

The system at the Centre is, no doubt, an advance. But is it so great an advance as it is said to be? To use a figure of speech, what is offered is only half an orange. If all the half was offered it would have been something of an offer. What is, however, offered is the half squeezed many a time: once by the Governor General creditors of India in the name of the safety of their investments, once by the President of the Railway Board in the name of sound administration, and once by the Governor of the Reserve Bank in the name of stable currency. 

No Scope for Amendment 

The proposals show distrust of Indians. That was expected. But they also show distrust of the British people. In every Dominion responsible government was advanced more by variations in the Instrument of Instructions than by actual amendments in the Constitution Act. Under the Indian scheme, no Instrument of Instructions or variations thereof shall be operative unless they are sanctioned by both the Houses of Parliament. This departure from the usual practice leaves no room for growth. It clearly shows that the Conservative party does not wish to leave any scope for the Labour party. Should the latter come into power, to make any advance in the Constitution by decontrolling the discretionary powers of the governors and the Governor-General by effecting variations in the Instrument of Instructions beyond the boundary which the present Conservative party chooses to fix. Why talk about the growth of the Constitution?  

Can anyone be certain that once the Act is passed the putting into force of Constitution will be a matter of course? What is to happen if the Houses of Parliament refuses to pass the resolution? What is there to prevent the resolution being an authority for inaugurating only provincial autonomy and keeping back responsibility at the Centre? Assuming that after the dissolution of Parliament the Labour party, anxious to put the whole Constitution into operation, comes into power, can it do the trick, if the House of Lords declines to pass the required resolution? 

High Property Qualification 

Are these proposals welcome to the depressed classes? My answer is an emphatic No. The objection largely arises from the institution of second chambers. Second chambers in the provinces were not favoured by Montagu-Chelmsford Report. The Simon Commission reported against them. The whole country is opposed to their institution, and the White Paper in the main respected this view. The Select Committee, however, in their superior wisdom set this view at naught. The members of the second chambers will be elected on a high property qualification, and this will effectively prevent the depressed classes and the working classes from getting any representation in them.  

The proposals for the constitution of the Federal Upper Chamber from the worst feature of the whole scheme from this point of view. The White Paper proposals were for enabled the depressed classes to get eight or nine seats in Federal Upper House. The White Paper had made no provision for the special representation of Labour in the Federal Upper House, and that omission was justified by it on the ground that as there was representation for the depressed classes it was tantamount to the representation of Labour. Now that in the Select Committee’s report the depressed classes too have been denied representation in the Federal Upper House, both the depressed classes and the working classes will remain unrepresented there.  

Coequal Powers 

The provincial second chambers and the Federal Upper House, it must be remembered, are not vested with only a temporary suspensive veto. That might have made them tolerable. The Select Committee has deliberately altered the White Paper proposals in order to make the Federal Upper House coequal in authority in all respects with the Lower House, and the provincial second chambers do not stand on a different footing in their relation to the provincial lower chamber. Thus both at the Centre as well as in the provinces the concurrence of second chambers is made necessary for every measure, fiscal as well as non-fiscal.  

The question of to whom the power is transferred is no less important than the question of how much power is transferred. I am grieved to see that so little power is transferred to Indians. But I am equally distressed to find that what little power is transferred to the propertied classes and the Princes. The masses do not come into the picture at all. For them, the change in the Constitution is only a change of masters.  

The Select Committee has taken special precaution to see that none of the minorities such as the Moslems, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, and the Indian Christians lost their special representation in the Legislatures as a consequence of the changes proposed by them. The question that I ask is: Why have they treated the depressed classes differently? Why have they shown such callousness in their case?  

There were certain questions on which all Indians were united in their opinion. Why did the Select Committee flout this unanimity of Indian opinion? Why did it not respect it at least in those matters which did not affect the interests of the Englishman? 

Transcribed by – Pardeep Attri